Chinese Super League Explained (Again)

Here is a bit of a sweeping statement but one that through a bit of research seems to have a good bit of truth in it. 

China will not really be accepted by its own people as a global super power until it attains similar status in the world rankings of the sport of football. 

The undeniable fact is that, for such a huge nation China is crap at the beautiful game.

This was not always the case as before the Civil War, in the 1930’s, the National Team dominated the competition in their part of Asia. 

The victorious Communist State policy prioritised football as very low and it was not until 1979 that China rejoined the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA). 

Since then underachievement has persisted with no qualification to a World Cup Finals and just two wins, five years apart in the East Asia Cup. 

There is no doubting the popularity of football in China with legal and other transmissions of English Premier and European League games with potential to reach a 1.35 billion audience. President Xi Jinping is a fan and his perception of the commercial and propaganda value of football has been a contributory factor behind the State goal to make China a football world power by 2050. 

As in other Socialist Market economic policy areas the Government set out the rules and then these tend to be interpreted by the State Bureaux, Provincial leaders and private enterprise with the outcome being, in reality and practice, quite a flexible version of the original. 

Western Media has, in the last 12 to 18 months been swamped by the hype and hysteria of the Chinese Super League (CSL) even to the point of it appearing to pose a major commercial threat to the dominance of the rich and influential Premier and European Leagues. 

The CSL was actually formed in 2004 when the existing Jia-A League was rebranded. This earlier incarnation of football had seen brief populist and financial success in the 1990’s but was plagued by match fixing, widespread abuse of gambling and endemic corruption. Even under the refreshed form of the CSL the same worst excesses persisted by 2010 and although sanctioned still lurk in the background. 

The current CSL consists of 16 teams, all located in main population centres in the eastern part of China. The climate of low temperatures determines that the season runs from February/March through to November/December. Under the broad State remit to attain a high world ranking many of the technical and business aspects of global football have been adopted through the importation of management ideas, professional standards and of course, through the importation of selected foreign personnel from on and off pitch specialisms. 

The shopping list of foreign star players heading for China remains a matter of intense speculation and rumour in the media. CSL teams were, from 2011, allowed five foreign squad players but with only four including an Asian Confederation player to be allowed on the pitch at any one time. The top three teams at the end of the season have eligibility to play in the Asian Champions League and the bottom two teams suffer relegation to China League 1. 

Centralised State Control is overriding but the funding and day to day business operations of the teams is from the wealth and power of the Chinese private sector in industry, commerce and finance. 

The 16 CSL participants show their corporate identity with the suffixes to their home towns being not ,as in English football United, City, Town and Athletic but the branded names of some of the largest companies in China. Guangzhou, who have dominated the CSL for the last few seasons are run by Evergrande, a construction conglomerate. Other parent companies include the Port of Shanghai, Investment and banking groups and in the Property and Medical sectors. The huge spending power, branding awareness and commercial profile of the companies has been behind the massive hype although many have published financial losses in their football operations. This clearly illustrates that football is a loss leader within the much bigger promotional picture of the main business interests of the owners. 

However, such has been the emphasis on furthering the image and public perception of the core companies that the consequence has been the excess of moneys targeted to lure foreign stars to play in the CSL. This has caused significant concern at State level and at the mid point of the current season (2017)  the Chinese Government firmly applied the brakes to the spiralling situation. 

The transfer fees for overseas players were effectively doubled with the imposition of a levy equal to the fee (if under £5.3 million) to be directed to the Youth System of the game and above that threshold to a State Development Fund. 

These measures have quickly stifled the speculation of the massive deals of up front payments and obscene, even by Premier League standards, weekly wages. 

Keeping in context the CSL is still very much in its infancy and as such the teething problems of run-away commercialism are to be expected. 

In the 2016 season the total CSL attendance was just under 6 million and with an average crowd per match of 24,000 which remained around the same in 2017 so about the average gate seen at English Championship level. 

The development of Chinese players has been slow. The season end Golden Boot Award for top scorer has gone to a foreign player for the last four years but with the best Chinese striker, Wu Lei, topping the scoring statistics with 27 goals in 29 games in the 2018 season. 

There are models globally where fledgling National Teams have successfully learned all aspects of the game from foreign imported players. The US MSL is now predominantly of home grown talent and with an improving record of performance on the American continent and the World Cup. 

China has attained global Superpower status in just about everything else through central planning and strong governance but the business of making football work for the benefit of the State is proving to be bit more difficult than expected.